

# Lebanon II (2006) As a Model

ORGANIZATION CULTURE DIFFERS FROM STATE CULTURE – THERE IS A NEED FOR NEW THINKING METHODS

- **War environment:**

- No decision
- The adversary is a partner to the outcomes
- All sides wins
- Media aggressive domination
- Home front and public opinion a decisive factor



- **Warfighting Environment:**

- Non-linear fighting
- All Dimensions Joins (Land, Air, Sea, Virtual)
- Asymmetry between Power (Army) and Motivation (Organization)
- Warfighting Leading Principles – Agility, Jointness, Lethality, Improvisation (Mission Command), Deep Penetration, Unity of Command

# 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY 1<sup>ST</sup> QTR. – NATURE OF WARS

- Different War Environment –
  - Different Surrounding – Population, Urbanization, Globalization
  - Different Powers – Non-State Organizations
  - Virtual Environment – IW, Cyber, Media

### Lebanon II – Samples

#### Environment:

- South Lebanon Population –used as “weapon system” by both sides
- Fire Strategy –used as decisive factor by both sides
- Fighting in and around urban terrain
- The Hezbollah main fighting area Israel’s cities

#### Power:

- There is no force Vs. Force fighting nor fighting over dominant terrain
- There are no fortified positions as line defense – “disappearing” enemy
- Low level tactical and dispersed battles – no counter attacks, no maneuver
- The enemy lacks - Air Force, Armor, Artillery

#### Virtual Environment:

- Fighting over symbols – Flags, POW, Body Count
- The COS – Participate in talk show at a TV studio


# War = Joint Military / Political Effort



Military Effort – Intensive effort to create the conditions for the political efforts

+

Political Effort – Continuous effort; based on the military achievements to reach the war goals



**WAR DOESN'T START NOR END BY FIGHTING**

# War Goals Fighting in Hezbollah Model

Deceive? Defense? Deter? Stabilize?

- While decisive battle is nonexistent there are other potential goals:
  - Gain the Initiative – Force the enemy to react to our plan – Preliminary Condition
  - Gain Superiority – Our freedom to operate with no major interference – might be Local, Temporary or Specific
  - Gain Supremacy - Superiority in the operations area without enemy intervention (might be Territorial or Subject oriented)
  - Control – Forcing our will by physical or virtual means – over Terrain, System or holistic

In undeceive war VICTORY is moral statement - everyone wins



Control

Supremacy

Superiority

Initiative

**COA's AND MEANS DIFFER IN ANY REQUIRED GOAL**

# DEFENSE AND OFFENCE JOINTLY AT THE SAME TIME



AT UNDECEIVE WAR OFFENCE AND DEFENSE CONDUCTED SIMULTANEOUSLY

# The Enemy Have Voting Rights

- **The enemy is partner at the war end terms setting**

- Warfighting achievements should create superiority over the enemy at his home and toward the world by:

Military - Kinetic

- Gain the initiative, achieve superiority , force actions and situations
- Force the enemy into defensive situations at his critical positions in his territory (by fire and maneuver)
- Destroy his victory narrative internally and globally

- Reinforce the asymmetry advantages you hold – power, agility, continuity – change the “game rules”

Military + Political - Virtual

**WHILE ABSENCE OF PHYSICAL DECISION - PLANNING SHOULD DRIVE FROM THE ENEMY WAY OF THINKING RATHER THAN HIS DEPLOYMENT**


**THERE ARE NO END STATES – ANY SITUATION IS A STARTING POINT**

# THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS PRIOR THE WAR

- The Hezbollah control the operation in South Lebanon from Beirut HQ
- Warier and ammunition will move from Beirut to the South as the war starts
- Massive number of casualties will bring to moral collapse and surrender

## THE IDF SITUATION AWARENESS / PLANNING

- Targeting strategic infrastructure will :
  - It will involve France Government to place pressure on the Lebanese Government
  - The Lebanese Government will pressure the Hezbollah to stop the fire
- Targeting (by the Air Force) Hezbollah HQ and Communication Centers will destroy its C2 system
- Targeting the roads and bridges system (by the Air Force) will block the reinforcement and collapse the operational system
- Massive number of casualties will stop the resistant and wilt cause moral collapse



The Strategic Concept

To strengthen the Deterrence and design multi-nations relationship system....stop the terror...place pressure over Hezbollah...significant blow to Hezbollah

# The Hezbollah Situation – July 2006

- The doctrine encompass on the IDF weaknesses:
  - Do not fight over ground control
  - Avoid decisive battles
  - Do not concentrate – dispersed organization
  - The IDF is NOT the main fighting object
  - The fighting goals are not in Lebanon but in Israel's urban centers
- High moral and motivation– damages and casualties are not a decisive factors
- Suppress hi-technologies by simplicity, hiding, dispersion and small units
- The IDF's attack plan is known – there are no surprises

**THE IDF'S INTELLIGENCE KNEW – BUT DIDN'T UNDERSTAND  
THE INTELLIGENCE SHOULD KNOW, THE COMMANDER MUST UNDERSTAND**



# General Hassan Turkemani Insights

Syrian's Army COS 2002-2009



- Hezbollah gained surprise superiority
- Israel lacked concentration at a decisive sector
- Hezbollah gain superiority in information and intelligence
- Hezbollah crashed Israel's deterrence
- Hezbollah succeeded penetration into Israel rear by rockets and influenced the Israeli population
- The war became an asymmetric war
- The Israeli concept of defending Israel at the border collapsed

# Different War Environment

- Decisive war replace by multi-goals war:
  - Initiative
  - Superiority – by actual power ratio (rather than Force Ratio)
  - Supremacy – dictate the activities in chosen sector
  - Control – over terrain, forces, COG

**Lebanon II samples:**

**Initiative:**

The war started as continuation to local incident – conducted as rolling operations

When the initial plan blocked by the political level – there was no attempt for another decisive plan

Local initiatives – i.e. raids – rather than main offence

**Forces Power Superiority**

Attacks stopped due to casualties

Attacks did not materialized due to risk of casualties

There was no meaning to forces ratio

Massive artillery fire with no effect

**Superiority**

Next to the border Cleanup operations

Raids

**Supremacy**

Lack of will to major ground orpation

# THE MEDIA AGGRESSIVE CONTROL

The media as weapon system – role changing (from report to influence)

The virtual dimension as the 4<sup>th</sup> dimension in warfighting

Its objectives located far from the battle space (the media is the launcher, the message is the ammunition)

IW conducts before, during and after the fighting


The objectives are public opinion and decision makers at:

- Local audience
- Adversary audience
- NGOs
- International community leaders

Constantly effecting warfighting at all levels:

- Tactical
- Operational
- Strategic





Time (in  
seconds) to  
enter a shelter

# THE HOME FRONT IS A DECISIVE FACTOR

- The enemy aim at the rear population and infrastructure NOT at the army
  - The line of contact as protective wall is NOT sufficient
  - The Home front fight a defensive battle (active or passive) via robustness, protection, survivability and moral
  - The longer the war is the higher the home front involvement is

## Meanings:

- War planning must include objectives protecting the rear side by side with those supporting the political goals
- The home front robustness influence the fighting duration and the politicians freedom of maneuver

**IT CALLS FOR MUCH HIGHER CIVILIAN LEVEL INVOLVEMENT IN WAR PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT**

# ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Forces Ratio

Fighting Environment

Center of Gravity

Non-linear warfighting

## Goliath was suppose to win if only:

- Has understand his opponent
- Gain the initiative and ignored the old concepts
- Choose proper fighting techniques

## David success derived from:

- Gained the initiative by surprise
- Gained Superiority over the fighting space (long range, accuracy, lethality)
- Good asymmetric exploitation – agility, maneuver



When fighting NGOs we are Goliath – Asymmetry is advantage for the one that use it better

# FROM FORCE RATIO TO POWER RATIO

- While fighting dispersed enemy the power ratio (actual effect at point of contact) is more important than force ratio (Quantity)
- Fight the systems (fire, maneuver, logistics, C2) rather the formations
- Each system have its own power centers – the system's COG , fight those COG or what influences it

# Non-Linear warfare

agility, jointness, lethality, mission command, depth, unity of command

## Move the battlefield

Choose where you want to fight – force the enemy to run after you

Plan autonomous battlefields that can dispersed or concentrate as the situation develops

## Be aggressive, dynamic and agile via:

- Build tactical missions autonomous task forces
- Operate several TF at the same time to achieve operational objectives
- Keep a lot of reserve to support, reinforce, concentrate effort, maintain the momentum etc.

## Unity of Command

- A mission have one commander only – regardless the forces sources

There is no End Stat – every situation is starting point

# SUMMARY – THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY WARS CHARACTERS

Different players, tools and courses of actions

- Multi dimensions war – Quality superiority gives advantage
- Force ratio superiority lost importance compare with political and virtual power ratio
- Victory in war is strategic – tactical victory is moral victory
- Strategy and Tactics merge – hierarchy collapse, network warfighting
- Technology race – Hi-Tec Vs. simplicity allows asymmetry turnover
- The 4<sup>th</sup> dimension (virtual) change importance and uses of Time & Space, Power Ratio, and Objectives selection

ONE CAN WIN WITH THE OLD WAYS BUT THE PRICE PAID WILL BE HIGHER THAN NEEDED



# How Lebanon II looks?

- Despite that war failures it is important road mark for:
  - Fighting NGOs
  - An exercise for future war in constantly fast changing war environment



2014 - 2010 - 2006

What? Why? So?



2045 - 2035 - 2025